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RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN DEEDS
By JA%_Es F. KIRBY -
No attempt is made in this article to analyze any consider-
able number of the many decisions upon this subject. Nor will
it be possible to examine the many refinements of doctrine to
which the courts have gone in applying the law of "Equitable
Easements". I shall attempt merely to state a few of the rules
applicable to this subject that are well defined and almost unani-
mously sustained by the adjudicated cases and to cite some of
the cases, together with reference books where other authorities
may be found, should a further examination of the subject seem
profitable to the reader.
The doctrine of covenants, restraining the use of real pro-
perty, is the child of equity. Equity charges the conscience of
a grantee of land with an agreement relating to the land, al-
though the agreement neither creates *an easement nor consti-
tutes a covenant running with the land; and it does this even
though the covenant may not be binding in law, provided the
grantee takes with notice.'
But the covenant must be reasonable, it must be certain and
not vague, and the right to relief must not be doubtful. The
covenant must relate to and concern the land, or its use or en-
joyment. It- cannot be in parole, at least as against subsequent
grantees. While equity dislikes hard bargains, the fact that the
defendant will suffer loss will not stay the hand of equity from
enforcing such a covenant by injunction. The restrictions may
be placed in a plat of a sub-division to a city.2
The leading case usually cited on this subject is Tulk v. Moxhay,
2 Phillips ch. 774, decided by Lord Cottonham in 1848, on a cove-
nant entered into in 1808. This case has been the subject of
some judicial controversy and judges have disagreed as to the
reasons upon which the decision was made.
Sir George Jessel, master of the rolls, said of it: "The de-
4 Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. 11 Gray 359, 363.
2 Curtis v. Rubin (Ill.) 91 N. E. 84.
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cision in that case, rightly understood, appears to be either an
extension in equity of the doctrine of Spencer's Case, (1 Smith
Leading Cases 145, 5 Coke'16a,) to another line of cases, or else
of an extension in equity of the doctrine of negative easements."3
Lord Justice Cotton said: "As I understand Tulk v. Moxhay,
the principle there laid down was that, if a man bought an
underlease, although he was not bound in law by the restrictive
covenants of the original lease, yet, if he purchased with notice
of these covenants, the court of chancery could not allow him to
use the land in contravention of the covenants. That is a sound
principle. If a man buys land subject to a restrictive covenant,
he regulates the price accordingly, and it would be contrary to
equity to allow him to use the land in contravention of the re-
strictions."4
Chief Justice Beasley thought the principle governing this
case to be as follows: "It will be found on examination that
these decisions (Tulk v. Moxhay and others) proceed upon the
principle of preventing a party having knowledge of the just
rights of another from defeating .such rights and not upon the
idea that the engagement enforced created an easement, or is of
a nature to run with the land."5
Lord Cottonham, in deciding Tulk v. Moxhay, explained it thus:
"It is said that the covenant being one which does not run
with the land, the court cannot enforce it; but the question is
not whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether the
party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsist-
ent with the contract entered into with his vendor and with
notice of which he purchased. Of course the price would be
affected by the covenant, and nothing could be more inequitable
than that the original purchaser should be able to sell the pro-
perty the next day for a greater price, in consideration of the
assignee being allowed to escape from the liability which he had
himself undertaken."
Thus able lawyers have disagreed as to the reason for the
doctrine by which a subsequent purchaser is restrained in the
use of real estate by a covenant in a deed to which he was not a
s Railway Co. v. Gomm 20 Ch. Div. 562, 563.
4 Hale v. Erwin 37 Ch. Div. 74.
5 Brewer v. Marshall, 19 N. J. Eq. 537, 543.
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party and which need not run with the land. But when we con-
sider what the courts actually do, it appears that the restriction
is upon the use that may be made of the particular land rather
than upon the particular owner who may desire to make that use
of it, though the covenant may be said to be a personal one and
not to run with the land. Let us say that A sues to prevent B
from operating a smithy upon B's lot which is burdened with a
restrictive covenant prohibiting the operation of a smithy'there-
on. B is not restrained from operating a smithy but only from
operating it upon that particular land. The right enforced is
the right in A to have this particular lot used, or rather not used,
in a particular manner. That is to say it is a right or an interest
vesting in A, in a particular piece of real estate, which is enforced
by the decree, and thi*s relief would be granted in favor of any
owner of A's property against any owner of B's property at-
tempting a like violation of the covenant. A and B are only
incidental, the right, or interest, in the lot is essential.
It therefore appears that equitable easements, servient and
dominant equitable estates, are not inept terms to apply to the
benefits and burdens, rights and restrictions, arising out of cove-
nants in deeds restricting the free use of land by owners who
acquire title subsequent to the making of such covenants by
which its use is limited.6
Equity will grant relief against a person violating a cov-
enant restricting the free use of land only when he purchases
with notice of the covenant. An innocent purchaser for value
and without notice takes free from the burden of such covenants.
But this notice need not be actual notice; it may be constructive,
as by record, contained in the chain of title, or even by know-
ledge of the'general observance of certain rules of building in the
neighborhood.7
In the past at least the rule has been, that restrictions on the
free use of land are repugnant to the recognized policy of this
country; that they are not favored by the law, and that they will
be strictly construed against the party seeking to enforce them.
6 C. J. Deeds see. 463; Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. 4 ed. see. 1693; R. C. L. Deeds
sec. 178, Covenants see. 39; Covenants, 21, 84, 91, 103; Injunctions, Key Nos.
58, 62;'Sprague v. Kimball 213 Mass. 380, 100 N. E. 622; Whitney v. Union
Ry. Co. 11 Gray 359, 363.7 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. sec. 1704; Covenants, Key No. 84; C. 3. Deeds sec.462; Dedication, Key No. 48; Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. 11 Gray 359; Curtis
v. 'Rubin (Il1.) 91 N. E. 84.
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All doubts must. be resolved in favor of the free use of the
property by the owner.8
To such an extent has this doctrine of strict construction
been carried that where a lot was a corner lot and it was doubt-
ful whether or not the restriction applied to a cross street, an
injunction restraining the erection of an offending building on
the cross street was refused.9
And where a covenant was originally made as to several-
city blocks embracing a number of streets, the right to enforce
it was limited to persons owning property on the street where
the offending building was being erected.' 0
It has been said that restrictive covenants will be enforced
regardless of the amount of damage suffered by the complaining
party." Still there is a doctrine of substantial compliance, es-
pecially where the restrictions are a part of a general building
scheme. The majority rule seems to be that equity will not en-
force mere technical or immaterial violations of such covenants. 3
When the damages resulting from the violation of the cove-
nant are slight, equity will sometimes refuse specific perform-
ance by injunction.3 A substantial compliance so as to accom-
plish the purpose intended is all that equity will require. 4
Equity will inquire to ascertain what is a substantial com-
pliance under all the conditions existing at the time the action
is brought and will inquire into the relation of the parties as to
their rights in the land, and will use its discretion as to granting
relief ys
8 18 C. J. 385, Notes 93, 94, 95 & Page 387 Notes 19, 20; Test Oil Co. v. La
Totqrette, 19 Okla. 214; 91 P: 1025; Eckhart v. Irons, 128 Ill. 568, 20 N. E.
687; Voorhees v. Blum, 274 Ill. 319, 113 N. E. 593; Melson v. Ormsby, 169 Ia.
522, 161 N. W. 817; Casterton v. Plotkin, 188 lich. 333, 154 N. W. 151; Cove-
nalts, Key Nos. 20, 21, 49; Deeds, Key No. 170.
9 Howland v. Andrus, 81 N. J. Eq. 175; 86 A. 391; C. J. Deeds sec. 451,
Po.,ge 390 n. 45; Injunction. Key Nos. 58. 62.
10 Loomis v. Collins (Ill.) 111 N. E. 999; Dedication, Key No. 47.
11 Miller v. Klein., 177 Mo. A. 557, 160 S. W. 562.
ig 18 C. J. Page 399 n. 82.
A variation of a few inches in elevation of the lower floor of a house
was held immaterial. N elson v. Ormsby 169 Ia. 522, 151 N. w. 817.
-Overhapging of eaves two feet and two Inches twenty-four feet from
the ground was said to be immaterial. Smith v. Spencer (N. J.) 87 A. 158.
Round towers, bats or projections and piazzas with slender columns
on the second story of a house projecting a few feet beyond the line areimmaterial. M/orrow v. Hasselman, 69 N. J. Eq. 612, 61 A. 369.
A bay window which would obstruct plaintiff's view of the Hudson
River was said to be a substantial violation of the covenant, but someprgjecting eaves and cornices were said to be immaterial. MIeaney V.
S Jork (N. .) 83 A. 492.
is Injunction Key No. 62.
14 Covenants Key No. 103.
15 Melson v. Ormsby 169 Ia. 522, 151 N. W. 817; Specific Performamce,
Key No. 8; Covenants, Key No. 91, 103.
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Not only will equity stop at a substantial performance of
the covenant, but, if it appears that it is being used as a means of
oppression and annoyance, it will cancel it. These covenants at
times may become so burdensome as to practically destroy the
value of property to the owners, and in sucn" case equity should
grant relief by cancellation after a proper showing." This is well
illustrated by the following cast.
Restrictive covenants like all other obligations may be des-
troyed by release; but to have this effect the release must be by
all persons whose lands are entitled to the benefit of the cove-
nant. Thus an owner of a sub-division, who sells the lots sub-
iect to restrictions, cannot afterward release one of the lots.
What right he might have to sell it free from restrictions, if'he
had declared a forfeiture of title for violation of the covenant
providing for forfeiture, was not determined; but he could not
sell his right of forfeiture to a stranger who could then release
the restrictions to the owner, who was violating the covenant and
thus merge the forfeiture, the restrictions, and the right to re-
lease and thus defeat the rights of other owners.'7
The right to insist on compliance with such covenants may
be waived, or lost by laches, as where one party, with full
knowledge of all the facts, allows the other to expend large sums
in valuable improvements, or where the owner of one tract, in a
general building scheme, himself violates the covenant. This
statement is qualified by exceptions which must be examined in
each particular case. 8
But where plaintiff permitted obstructions to the west of
his property, in which direction the prospect was negligible, he
was held not to have waived his right to insist on the observance
of the restrictions by property owners to the east of him which
obstructed his view of a great avenue and the Hudson river.9
When plaintiff permitted a stable to be maintained on lot by
covenantor for some years, she could not have his grantee en-
i St. Stephen's Church v. Church of the Transfiguration (N. Y.) 130
-App.-Dlv. 166 C. J. Deeds Page 399 n. 74.
17 Hopkins v. Smith, 162 Mass. 444, 38 N. E. 1122; Kimball et al v. Corn
.Ave St. Ry. Co., 17? Mass.. 152. 53 N. E. 274; Beetem v. Garrison, 129 Md.
664, 99A, 897; Covenants, Key No. 72. 79 (3). Cent. Coy. 73-76; C. 3. Deeds
Sec. 469.
18 C. J. Deeds Sec. 468; Duncan v. Central Pass. Rq. Co. 85 Ky. 225, 4 S.
W . ' 228; Witherspoon v. Hurst, 88 S. C. 561, 71 S. E. 232; Loomis v. Collins(i.) 111 N. E. 999.
1g Meaney v. Stork, (N. J.) 83 A. 492.
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joined from maintaining it. But the grantee could not enlarge
it or make other objectionable use of the lot. Plaintiff must act
seasonably to assert this right before money has been expended
or liability incurred or he will be barred by laches. 20
Restrictive covenants may terminate by expiration, by aban-
onment, and'by operation of statute. If the restriction is for a
limited term of years it will, of course, terminate at the end of
the term. If no time limit is named, these covenants are pre-
sumed to continue for the duration of the estate created by the
instrument.2
If there is a statute by which the time is limited during
which the title or use of real estate may be restricted, this, of
course, will govern; and the restrictive covenant, though un-
limited as to duration in the instrument creating it, will term-
inate by force of such statute in the time prescribed by the sta-
tute.22 If, however, the statute is only declaratory of the rule
against perpetuities it probably does not have this effect.23 The
opposite rule has been announced in England.*
The violation of the covenant by the complaining party mayr
constitute an abandonment and so a defense as to him. A geh-
eral abandonment may terminate or destroy the covenant. -If
terminated by abandonment each owner may thereafter use his
property for any proper purpose. The following cases illustrate
the results of abandonment and the particular facts that have
been held to establish it. Extending a sun-room or porch over
the building line is not an abandonment of a general building
plan nor of the restrictive covenants establishing its
As a general rule equity will not enforce a restrictive cove-
nant, where, on account of change in the condition of the neigh-
borhood, the violation becomes immaterial and the enforcement
2o0 Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. 11 Gray (Mass.) 359, 367.
21 Gifford v. Syracuse etc. 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 114; Landell v. Hamilton,
175 Pa. 327 34 A. 663.
22 Revised Laws of Mass. 1902 Chapter 134 Sec. 20; Riverbank, etc.,
Co. v. Bancroft et al 209 Mass. 217, 95 N. E. 216; Deeds, Key Nos. 170, 17-.
23 Palmer et al v. President et al (R. 1.) 24 A. 109; Proprietors of Ch.
in Brattle Sq. v. Grant 3 Gray 142; Phillips et al v. Harrow et al (Ia.) 61
N. W. 434; Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. 11 Gray 359, 366; 30 Cyc Page 1479
N. 68.
24 30 Cyc Page 1478 N. 67.
25 Godley v. Weisman (Minn.) 157 N. W. 711, 712; Bangs v. Potter, 135
Mass. 245; Smith V. Price, 214 Mass. 298. 101 N. E. 370; Chelsea Land etc.,
Co. v. Adams, 71 N. J. Eq. 771, 66 A. 180; Thorburn v. Morris (IN. J.) 75 A.
'757; Thompson v. Langan, 172 Mo. A. 64, 154 S. W. 808; Covenants, Key
No. 103; Loomis v. Collins, (Ill.) 111 N. E. 999; Injunction Key No. 62.
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would not materially benefit the complaining party and would
only work inconvenience, hardship, and loss to the party com-
plained against. 6
-Covenants are found relating not only to land, building
restrictions and business permitted to be carried on, but even to
restraints upon the use of personal property. And restraints
upon the use of personal property have been enforced in equity2
Just what covenants will, be enforced as legal on the one
hand or refused enforcement on the other as against public
policy, in restraint of trade, or as incapable of enforcement on
account of inherent difficulties, varies much in -the several
states.8
In the following cases the agreements were held to be
against public policy as in restraint "of trade and relief was
denied.
The means used by courts of equity to enforce these cove-
nants restraining the free ilse of land is the injunction, except
where the covenant provides for a fdrfeiture of title in case of
breach or a reversion to the original grantor 3 0
If the owner, in violation of a restrictive covenant, know-
ingly, and against the protest of plaintiff proceeds to build, a
mandatory injunction will be granted to compel the removal
of the building or the offending portions thereof. And in some
cases this form of relief has been granted even where the vio-
lation was slight.3-
The right to enforce these restrictive covenants rests upon
26 Ewertsen v. Gerstenberg, 186 I. 344, 57 N. E. 1051, 51 L. R. A. 310;
Jackson v. Stevenson 156 Mass. 496, 31 N. E. 691; 18 C. J. Page 400 N. 85.$7 Pomeroy's E q. Jur. See. 1706.
28 In New York a covenant not to sell sand was enforced. Iodge v.
Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244, 17 N. E. 335.
In Massachusetts enforcement of a covenant not to open a quarry was
refused. Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188 2 N. E. 946.
In Pennsylvania a railroad company which had expended large sums
to help develop ore lands in considel:ation of the exclusive right to haul
freight was granted relief as against -a mortgage after foreclosure. Bald
Eagle Valley R. Co. v. Nittany etc. 171 Pa. St. 284, 33 A. 239.
While in Minnesota an agreement to give a railroad the exclusive right
tQ haul the products of certain land was held not to concern the land and
enforcement was refused. Kettle River R. Co. v. Eastern R. Co. 41 Minn.
461., 43 iN. W. 469.
29 West Virginia Trans. Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co. 22 W. Va. 626,
46 Am. 1R. 527; Brewer v. Marshall, 19 N. J. Eq. 537.
so Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. Sections 1693 to 1705; Injunctions, Key Nos. 58.
621 C. J. Injunctions Sections 316-334.
uz Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. Sec. 1705; Attorney General v. Algonauln Club.
153 Mass. 447, 27 N. E. 2, 11 L. R. A. 500; Turney v. Shriver, 269 I1. 164, 109
N. E. 708; Supploe v. Cohen. 80 N. 3. Eq. 83. 83 A. 373; Gatzmer v. German
R7 C. Asylum, 147 Pa. St. 313. 23 A. 452.
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the principle that every owner of real property has the right to
deal with it so as to restrain its use by his grantees within such
limits as will prevent its appropriation to purposes which will
impair the value or diminish the pleasure of the enjoyment of
the land which he retains. Provided always that this right shall
be exercised reasonably with due regard to public policy and
without creating an unlawful restraint of trade.32
These rights, resting as they do on agreement, the principle
in equity that that which is agreed to be done shall be considered
As p'ekf6rmed applies, and a purchaser of land with' notice of a
right, or interest in it, subsisting in another, is liable to the same
extent and in the same manner, and is bound to do that which
his vendor had agreed to do. And therefore a covenant merely
personal in its nature, and not purporting to bind assignees, will
be enforced against them unless they have a higher and better
equity as bona fide purchasers without notice.S3
Therefore if the covenant is full, clear, and explicit as to. the
parties by. and against whom enforcement may be had and as to
the land to be'burdened, and the land to be benefited, there is no
difficult-, so lonk as the agreement does not violate any prin-
ciple of law. For instance, if the covenant expressly states that
it is for the personal benefit of, the covenantee and specifically
negatives the.1dea that it is for the benefit of any other person or
for the benefit of any other particular land, then it is clear that
no one but the grantor can enforce it. It follows that if the cove-
nant states that it is for the benefit of A and his grantees of a
certain lot or lots and is to burden B and his grantees of a certain
lot or lots, there can be no question of interpretation and the
covenant will be enforced, .subject always to the rule among
others that the relief is not a matter of strict right and the court
will exercise its discretion. But this discretion is a judicial dis-
cretion, is not arbitrary, and, where'the right is clear and there
are no intervening equities, the relief will be granted.
The remote grantees of the original covenantee receive the
same protection in equity.as" he does. His additional right to
proceed at law need not be taken up here. But in most cases
where the plaintiff seeks to enforce a restrictive covenant he must
82 Vendor ahd Purchaser, Key No. 79.
s Whitney v. Union Ry Co. 1. Gray 359, 364, 365.
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show a privity of estate with the covenantee. Privity with the
covenantor is not material. Thus if A is the owner of several
lots and conveys them to different purchasers by deeds contain-
ing restrictive covenants that may be enforced against vendees
of the other lots-conveyed, B who asks that C be restrained from
violating his covenant must show privity of estate with A and
not with X, who purchased of A and sold to C, nor with C. And
of course Y who claims through a chain of title superior to and
adverse to A, can in no event claim the benefit of the covenant.4*
The limits of this article will not permit a discussion of the cases
where privity is necessary and where it is not.
Where the covenant merely places a restraint upon .the use
of the land conveyed without more, or it is uncertain or doubtful
as to the parties by and against whom enforcement may be had
or the land to be benefited or burdened, the courts must resort
to construction to ascertain the intention of the parties; and that,
once clearly ascertained, will control. In order to arrive at the
intention of the parties, the situation and the surrounding cir-
cumstances in connection with the terms of the grant may be
taken into consideration.35
For our purpose we may divide the cases in which relief may
be granted into five classes:
I. The covenant is personal to the covenantee and does not
purport to apply to any land except the land conveyed by the
deed creating the covenant. In such case the covenant 'cannot
usually be en*forced by anyone after the original covenantee has
disposed of all his holdings in the vicinity except in certain cases
of which forfeitures and reversions are the most conspicuous
examples.36
II. The second class of cases is where A the owner of a
certain tract of land or a number of lots, let us say of three lots,
numbered 1, 2 and 3, sells lots 2 and 3 to B and C and in each
deed he inserts a restrictive covenant. Then B and C sell to
D and E who take with notice. Let us further suppose that in
this case there is no general building scheme. If these res-
trictive covenants are for the benefit of A to protect his property
34 18 C. J. Page 394 Sec. 458; Norcross v. James 140 Mass. 188. 189.
s5 Beals v. Case, 138 Mass. 138; Melson v. Ormsby, (Ia) 151 N. W. 817;
Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. See. 1696; Firth v. Marovich, (Cal.) 116 P. 729.
. 86 Firth v. MaTovich (Cal.) 116 P. 729; Doerr v. Cobbs (Mo. A.) 123 S.
W. 547; C. J. Deeds Sec. 460; Peck v. Conway 119 Mass. 546.
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against injury by the use of a neighboring tract without more,
neither B nor C nor their grantees can enforce the covenants be-
tween themselves, but A and his grantees can enforce them as
against B. C, D and E and their grantees with notice.37
But if the covenants were for the benefit of other land at
the. time of the conveyance or formerly belonging to A the sub-
,Sequent grantees of such other land, lot, or parcel may enforce
the- covenant under the following conditions:
A. If B purchased lot 2 first and C purchased lot 3 second,
C may enforce the covenant against B under certain
circumstances.
1. If C is an express assignee of the covenant as dis-
tinct from an assignee of the land; or
2. If the restrictive covenant is expressed to be for the
benefit of lot 3. In this case the benefit of the cove-
nant passes to C whether he knows of it or not. It
is in the nature of an easement attached to C's
property as the dominant estate.38
This is the English rule at present under such facts,
but the better rule and the American rule seems to
be that the intention of the parties to make C's land
the dominant estate may be- ascertained otherwise
than from the covenant and the assignment thereof.39
B. But B, having purchased lot 2 before C purchased lot 3,
B cannot ordinarily enforce the restrictive covenant
against C unless he can show that, at the time he pur-
chased lot 2, A entered into a binding agreement with
him (B) to the effect that he (A) would insert the res-
triction in the deed to lot 3, whenever he (A) should
sell it. In that case lot 3 becomes bound in favor of B
and lot 2 from the time of the conveyance of lot 2 from
A to B.40
III. The third class of cases arises where there is what is
called, a general building scheme. This occurs when the owner
- of a tract of land sub-divides it with the intention of selling the
37 Korn v. Campbell (IN. Y.) 85 N. M. 687, 689.
38 Reid v. Bickerstaff, 2 Oh. 305, 320.
39 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. 4th ed. Sec. 1696 N. 17 and Sec. 1697 N. 19; Beals
v. Case, 138 Mass. 138.
40 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. Sec. 1697 T. 19; Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass.
380, 100 N. E. 622; Deeds Key No. 173.
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lots all subject to general building or oth~rrestrctions -so as to
preserve to the neighborhood a special character such as a high
class Tesidential district.
In this case if A, B, C to X, Y, Z -purchase lots in such sub-
division at various times, but all subject to the restrictions, they
can each enforce the restrictions against any and 'all of the other
purchasers and their grantees with notice regardless of the order
of their purchases from the original vendor, or subsequently.
Thus if A purchased his lot before Y purchased his, A may still
enforce the covenant against Y and his grantees with notice.
And of course Y and his grantees have the same right as -against
A and his grantees. It is not necessary, where there is a general
building scheme, that the covenants in the -various deeds con-
form to absolute uniformity. Under certain circumstances the
covenant may be absent from some of the deeds without des-
troying the general building scheme4r
And it has been held that where the party who originally
makes the sub-division acquires additional land and sub-divides
it, the restrictions in the deeds conveying the lots in the original
sub-division will apply to the additional lots if they were -within
the content of the original plan. 2 To constitute a general build-
ing scheme, the owner need not have a multitude of lots. He
may have such a plan for two lots as well as ,for two hundred.4
A building restriction in the original deed of the whole land
which is 'also put in all subsequent deeds to purchasers of indi-
vidual lots has been held sufficient evidence of a general plan
for improvement and benefit of all the land.44
But with reference to the evidence necessary to establish a
general building scheme, when the covenant is not explicit as to
the land to be benefited, the land to be burdened, and the
-parties by and against whom it may be -enforced, Justice Parker
says: "It must be proved (1) that both the plaintiffs and de-
fendants derive title -under a common -vendor; (2) that -previously
to selling the lands to which the plaintiffs and defendants are
41 Allen v. Barnett, (Mass.) 99 N. -D. 575; Velie v. Richardson (Minn.)
148 X. IV. 286; Sanford v. Xeer 83 A. 225; 1Hooper -v. Lottman (Tex) 171 S.
W. 270.
4.2 C. J. Deeds Sec. 459; Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. Sec. 1697; IKneip v. Schroeder,
225 111. '$21. 99 N. -D. 617-; Highland Realty v. 'Groves. 130 'Ky. 374, 113 S. W-
420 A. N. S.; Allen v. Detroit. 167 Mich. 464, 133 N. W. 317.
4s Godley v. weisman (Minn.) 157 N. w. 711.
44 Godley v. -Weisman (Minn.) 157 N. W. 711; Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mas.
448, 451; St. Andrews Church's Appeal 67 Pa. 512.
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respectively entitled, the vendor laid out his estate, or a defined
portion thereof (including the lands purchased by the plaintiffs
and defendants respectively), for sale in lots subject to restric-
tions intended to be imposed on all the lots, and which, though
varying in details as to particular lots, are consistent and con-
sistent only with some general scheme of development; (3) that
these restrictions were intended by the common vendor to be and
were for the benefit of all the lots intended to be sold, whether
or not they were intended to be and were for the benefit of other
land retained by the vendor; and (4) that both the plaintiffs and
the defendants or their predecessors in title, purchased their lots
from the common vendor upon the footing that the restrictions
subject to which the purchases were made were to inure for the
benefit of the other lots inclu'ded in the general scheme, whether
or not they were also to inure for the benefit of other lands re-
tained by the vendor. If these four points be established, I think
that the plaintiffs would in equity be entitled to enforce the re-
strictive covenants entered into by the defendants or their pre-
decessors with the common vendor irrespective of the dates of
the respective purchases. I may observe, with respect to the
third point, that the vendor's object in imposing the restrictions
must in general be gathered from all the circumstances of the
case, including in particular the nature of the restrictions. If a
general observance of the restrictions is in fact calculated to en-
hance the value of the several lots offered for sale, it is an easy
inference that the vendor intended the restrictions to be for the
benefit of all the lots, even though he might retain other land
the value of which might be similarly enhanced, for the vendor
may naturally be expected to aim at obtaining the highest pos-
sible price for his land. Further, if the first thre points be es-
tablished, the fourth point may readily be inferred, provided the
purchasers have notice of the facts involved in the three first
points; but if the purchaser purchases in ignorance of any ma-
terial part of those facts, it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to establish the fourth point."45
The New Jersey court states the rule thus:
"The action is held not to be maintainable between pur-
45 Elliston v. Reacher, 2 Ch. 374, 384 (1908).
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chasers not parties to the original covenant, in cases in which-
(1) It does not appear that the covenant wa*s entered into to
carry out some general scheme or plan for the improvement .or
-development of the property which the act of defendant disre-
gards in some particular. (2) It does not appear that the cove-
nant was entered into for the benefit of the land of which com-
plainant has become the owner. (3) It appears that the cove-
nant was not entered into for the benefit of subsequent pur-
chasers, but only for the benefit of the original covenantee and
his next of kin. (4) It appears that the covenant has not en-
tered into the consideration of the complainant's purchase. (5)
It appears that the original plan has been abandoned without
dissent, or the character of the neighborhood has so changed as
to defeat the purpose of the covenant, and to thus render its en-
forcement unreasonable."4 6
The first statement in the above case applies only to a gen-
eral building scheme. The last four apply equally well to the
other four divisions of the cases herein set out.47
IV. The, fourth class, which is really the application of'
the principles of the second and third classes of cases to different
facts, arises where A, let us say, owns block X and three lots 1,
2, and 3 just across the street from block X in block Y. He sells
lot 3 to B with a restrictive' covenant. Shortly thereafter be sub-
divides block X under a general building scheme, into lots 1 to
12, and sells the said lots 1 to 12 to vendees M1 to M12, convey-
ing by deeds all containing the same covenant as contained in
B's deed. He then sells lot 2 in block Y to C with a like restric-
tive covenant. The purchasers of the lots in block X, as between
themselves, are governed entirely by the rules of class three. Of
46 DeGray v. Monmouth Beach Club House Co. 50 N. J. Eq. 329, 24 A 388.
47 a In the following cases a general building scheme was found to exist:
Fisk v. Ley (Conn.) 56 A. 559;-Curtis v. Rubin (Ill.) 91 N. E. 84; Weig-
man v. Kusel (Ill.) 110 N. E. 884; Loomis v. Collins (Ill.) 111 N. E. 999; Hartt
v. Rueter (Mass.) 111 N. E. 1045; Godley v. Weisman (Minn.) 157 N. W. 711.
b In the following cases no general building scheme was found:
Mulligan v. Jordan (N. J.) 24 A. 543; Judd v. Robinson (Colo.) 92 P. 724;
Webber v. Landrigan (Mass.) 102 N. E. 460; Zinn v. Sadler (Mo.) 187 S. W.
1172; Sailer v. Podolski (N. J.) 88 A. 967.
c The following cases contain some of the latest pronouncements of
the courts on restrictive covenants, wherein their use has been attempted
foi the purpose of promoting general building schemes:
Shuler v. Independent Sand & Gravel Co. (Ia.) 209 N. W. 731; Kramer v.
Nelson (Wis.) 208 N. W. 252; Schneider v. Eckhoff (Wis.) 206 N. W. 838;
Bailey v. Jackson (N. C.) 131 S. E. 567; Grusi v. Eighth Church etc. (Oregon)
241 P. 66; Sowers v. Vestry etc. (Md.) 131 A, 785; Storey v. Brush, (Mass.)
152 N. E. 225; Rochester etc. v. Rochester etc. (N. Y.) 126 Misc. 309; Cove-
nants, Key No. 79 (3), also No. 84.
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course B and C, as between themselves, are governed by the
rules of class two. And the rights of B, against the owners of
the lots in block X and their rights against him and the rights of
C against them and the rights of such owners against C are also
governed by the rules of class two unless in the case of B and C
their lots are brought within the general. building scheme. If
A's remaining lot 1 in block Y is not included within the general
building scheme embracing block X his right to have the cove-
nants" observed by the purchasers of lots in block X in favor of
his lot in block Y will be governed by the rules of class, two.
V. The fifth class is that in which the several owners of
lots in a neighborhood enter into covenants between themselves
restricting the use to which the land of each party may be de-
voted. In that case each party and his assigns can enforce the
covenants in equity against each of the ,other parties and his
assigns, who take with notice.48
48 Korn v. Campbell 192 N. Y. 490. 85 N. E. 687; Trustees of Columbia
Cgllege v. Lynch, 70 N Y 440 26 Am. R. 615; Brown v. Huber, 80 Oh. St.
183; Erlchsen v. Tapert, 172 M ch. 457, 138 N. W. 330.
